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Abstract: As the world’s largest importer of agricultural commodities, China’s 
agricultural policies have significant implications for the world agricultural market. For 
the first time, we develop an aggregate structural econometric model of China’s 
soybean market with linkage to the rest of the world to analyze the worldwide impacts 
of China’s soybean price support policies from 2008 to 2016. We investigate the 
impacts of China’s policies on the variability of their domestic and world prices, and 
adopt a Monte Carlo simulation to evaluate the distributional and aggregate welfare 
effects. Results indicate that (a) China’s soybean price support policies play an effective 
role in stabilizing their domestic price, while its increasing imports absorb world 
production surplus and reduce world price swings; (b) China’s producers gain at the 
expense of consumers and budgetary costs, and the net welfare change in their domestic 
market is negative; (c) Soybean exporting countries experience considerable welfare 
 2 
gains, and the world net welfare change is positive. Our findings provide new insights 
for future trade negotiations and agricultural market reforms in developing countries. 
 
JEL classifications: Q02, Q11, Q18 
Keywords: Agricultural price support policies; Price variability; Welfare; Aggregate 
structural model; Soybean; China 
 
1. Introduction 
The 2008 global food price crisis, which caused malnutrition and hunger, provoked 
riots in many countries and rekindled academic interest in food security (Barrett, 2010). 
In China, food security is expressed as “grain security” and evaluated by grain self-
sufficiency, which has long been proclaimed a top policy priority. To achieve grain 
self-sufficiency, China has continued to stimulate production with price incentives and 
producer subsidies, and has directly intervened in both the domestic agricultural market 
and international trade. The last two decades have also witnessed China’s tremendous 
transition from a net grain exporter to a net importer. As the world’s largest producer, 
consumer, and importer of agricultural commodities, any alteration in China’s 
agricultural policies exerts great influence on the world market.  
Agricultural policies and their impacts have attracted the attention of many 
researchers over the years. To the best of our knowledge, Johnson (1975) is the first to 
propose an integrated impression of the worldwide impacts of domestic agricultural 
policies. Most researchers focus on the price and welfare effects of agricultural subsidy 
policies (e.g., Thompson et al., 2002; Bhagwati, 2004; Koo and Kennedy, 2006; 
Schmitz et al., 2006) and trade distortion policies (e.g., Martin and Anderson, 2011; 
Götz et al., 2013; Diao and Kennedy, 2016; Porteous, 2017). Studies investigating the 
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impacts of price support policies in importing countries are scarce. Although there has 
been continually increasing concerns about China’s agricultural policies, especially on 
the historical reform of agricultural tax exemption, subsidy introduction, and the 
recently increasing investment in agricultural development (e.g., Gale et al., 2005; 
OECD, 2009; Huang et al., 2013), most researchers restrict their attention to China’s 
domestic market instead of an integrated picture of the world market. Moreover, a 
substantial body of literature has developed using partial or general equilibrium models 
for ex-ante analysis that are increasingly sophisticated and incorporate a variety of 
assumptions on market conditions (e.g., Bohman et al., 1991; Valenzuela et al., 2008; 
Diao and Kennedy, 2016; Li et al., 2018); however, there are no ex-post empirical 
analyses on the impacts of China’s soybean policies. China’s soybean price support 
policies have existed for more than ten years, providing a sufficient observation period 
to conduct an ex-post analysis.  
The objective of our article is to fill these gaps in the literature by providing an 
empirical assessment on the ex-post impacts of China’s soybean price support policies 
on price variability and economic welfare in an integrated picture of the world market. 
The price support policies included are the 2008 temporary procurement for reserve 
policy and the 2014 target price policy. Empirically, our analysis is based on an 
aggregate structural econometric model of the China/rest-of-the-world soybean market 
as estimated from 1985 to 2016. Compared to the partial or general equilibrium models, 
our model captures China’s soybean price support policies in an aggregate form and 
provide a more transparent framework. We use the model to evaluate the actual effects 
of China’s soybean price support policies on price variability in both the domestic 
market and the world market and compare it to the same situation without the policies. 
Utilizing the estimated values of our model parameters, we adopt a Monte Carlo 
 4 
simulation to investigate the distribution of gains and losses to China’s producers and 
consumers, China’s budgetary costs, and exporters in the rest of the world, as well as 
the aggregate welfare effects. 
Our contributions to the literature are as follows: first, we update the literature by 
addressing the worldwide impacts of China’s agricultural policies. We highlight the 
unanswered question of whether China’s agricultural market interventions to realize 
food security affect the world market; however, our findings are initial. Second, we 
contribute to the understanding of China’s agricultural policy development and inform 
the debate about the appropriate future roles for agricultural support policies in China 
and other developing countries. 
The remainder of this article is organized as follows. The next section introduces the 
background of China’s soybean support policies. Section 3 documents our efforts to 
develop the theoretical framework. The empirical model and data description are 
presented in section 4. Section 5 details the empirical results and section 6 provides 
conclusions and implications. 
 
2. Background of China’s soybean support policies 
The 2008 world food crisis caused unexpectedly high and volatile soybean prices. From 
July 2007 to June 2008, the world soybean price surged by 82.4% and then dropped by 
43% from its December 2008 peak. Alarmed by the adverse effects of world price 
instability and the possibility of food insufficiency in their domestic market, the 
Chinese government intervened by first providing and then steadily increasing price 
supports. The temporary procurement for reserve policy, which guaranteed Chinese 
farmers a minimum soybean price, was introduced in October 2008. When the market 
price falls below the minimum price, farmers can sell their soybeans to state-owned 
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grain enterprises (e.g., COFCO and SINOGRAIN), which stockpile soybeans with the 
goal of stabilizing the supply and consequently the domestic price (OECD, 2013). Each 
year since 2008, the Chinese government has increased the procurement price (see 
Table 1), intensifying its intervention and leading to serious price distortion in their 
domestic soybean market. China’s higher price increased the gap between their 
domestic price and the world soybean price, leading to rapidly increasing demand for 
lower-priced soybean imports (Zhong and Zhu, 2017; see Figure 1). Furthermore, 
Chinese authorities purchased a large volume of domestic soybeans at the minimum 
price level and soybean stocks gradually accumulated as the enterprises could not resell 
them at a profitable price in their domestic markets, leaving the government with 
excessive stockpiles and huge expenditures (Carter et al., 2012; Clever and Wu, 2016). 
As a result, China’s new food security challenge is that imports and stocks continue to 
increase at the same time (see Figure 1). As presented in Table 1, the Chinese 
government grain and oil reserve expenditure increased from 110.6 billion yuan in 2009 
to 164.9 billion yuan in 2013. 
 
[Figure 1 about here] 
 
In January 2014, the temporary procurement for reserve policy was abolished and 
the soybean target price policy was initiated. Under the target price policy, farmers 
receive a direct payment form the government when their domestic market price is 
below the target price (Huang and Yang, 2017). Table 1 shows that support prices 
remained at 4800 Yuan/t from 2014 to 2016 and a general uptrend in the government 
grain and oil reserve expenditure. 
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In March 2017, the target price policy was withdrawn, due to unsustainably high 
costs and inefficient policy implementation (Yu, 2017), and followed with a producer 
subsidy policy. The objective of this policy is to encourage their domestic soybean 
production while allowing domestic soybean price to decline, which helps stimulate 
consumption of domestic soybean and reduce imports. Accordingly, it is expected that 
the government can reduce expenditures for procurement and storage (Zhong and Zhu, 
2017). 
 
[Table 1 about here] 
 
We identify the fundamental policy regime period as being from 1985 to 2016.1 
Since the producer subsidy policy in 2017 separated direct subsidy from price support 
and intervened in the domestic market differently than the former two policies, we 
identify the temporary procurement for reserve policy (2008–2013) and the target price 
policy (2014–2016) as China’s soybean price support policies in this article. 
 
3. Theoretical framework 
It has long been recognized that domestic market intervention policies by large trading 
countries influence the worldwide trade flows. The extent of distortion depends not 
only on the trade volume of the country,2 but also the nature of the policies (Larue and 
Ker, 1993). Figure 2 summarizes how different agricultural support policies of a large 
                                                 
1 Time period prior to 1985 are not considered in this article because China implemented a government monopoly 
on soybean purchasing and marketing before 1985. In 1985, the Chinese government eliminated the mandatory grain 
purchase plan and established a market operation mechanism in the soybean market (No.1 documents issued by the 
Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party and the State of China, 1985). 
2 It is assumed that small exporting (importing) countries face a perfectly elastic import demand (export supply) 
from the rest of the world. Thus, for small trading countries, market intervention will not influence the world market, 
because the changes in imports or exports are not large enough to influence the world price (Koo and Kennedy, 
2005). 
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country influence the world price. Agricultural support policies mainly include trade 
policies, storage policies, subsidy policies and price support policies. It is 
acknowledged that agricultural subsidies are prevailing in developed countries while 
price support policies are common in developing countries. In developed countries, 
farmers adjust the allocation of resources in agricultural commodity production. The 
production surplus or shortage changes the aggregate demand or supply in the world 
market and eventually distorts trade flows. However, the situation in China is quite 
different—the support prices for soybeans are much higher than the world soybean 
prices, yet the policies fail to stimulate their domestic production.3 Thus, low-priced 
soybeans in the world market gain a competitive edge over China’s soybeans. China’s 
soybean price support policies and import demand raise the aggregate demand in the 
world market and eventually influence the world price. 
 
[Figure 2 about here] 
 
[Figure 3 about here] 
 
Figure 3 illustrated the impacts of China’s soybean price support policies on supply, 
demand and trade. Figure 3(a) shows China’s domestic soybean market, which faces 
an upward-sloped export supply schedule (ES) from the rest of the world in Figure 3(b). 
Under free trade, the equilibrium in the rest of the world is established at point M, where 
import demand schedule (ED) intersects with export supply schedule in Figure 3(b), 
and the trade volume equals Q1 at the world price of Pw1. Now consider China’s soybean 
                                                 
3 From 2009 to 2014, China’s soybean acreage declined from 20.8 million acres to 12.5 million acres—farmers tend 
to not grow more soybeans as there is no comparative advantage. For instance, according to the National Cost-
Benefit Compilation of Agricultural Product (NSBC, 2010–2015), from 2009 to 2014, the average net income from 
corn production was 1047.31 yuan/acre and the average net income from soybean production was 527.31 yuan/acre. 
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market under price support policies, or if the Chinese government sets a support price 
higher than the world price—import demand increases, the corresponding schedule is 
kinked upward to ED’, and new trade equilibrium is created at point N where export 
supply schedule intersects with the new import demand schedule, as depicted in Figure 
3(b). Accordingly, world price increases from Pw1 to Pw2 and trade volume increases 
from Q1 to Q2. Producer welfare increase since they receive higher domestic price (Pd) 
and they gain by areas A and C in Figure 3(a). Now assume that their domestic 
consumers face the world price under free trade—domestic consumption decreases 
from D1 to D3 with the world price increasing from Pw1 to Pw2, and consumers lose by 
areas C, D, E, and F. In the rest of the world, exporters are better off since the world 
price increases under China’s price support policies. They gain their surplus by the 
areas G and H in Figure 3(b). Accordingly, the net social welfare loss in China can be 
divided into four segments: (a) social welfare loss owing to misallocation of domestic 
resources; (b) consumers’ losses resulting from the rising world price; (c) extra outlays 
paid by the Chinese government; and, (d) welfare transfer from China to the exporting 
countries. 
 
[Figure 4 about here] 
 
Since world soybean production and soybean exports have maintained a steady 
growth rate from 2001 to 2017 (see Figure 4), we consider a new situation where the 
export supply in the rest of the world increases in the meantime. As shown in Figure 
3(c), the corresponding export supply moves downward to ES’ as world production 
increases, then trade equilibrium is re-established at point O, and the world price 
increases from Pw1 to Pw3, which is lower than Pw2. In this case, the distortion of the 
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world price is much smaller since China’s increase of soybean imports absorbs part of 
the world production surplus.  
 
4. Empirical model and data 
4.1. China/rest-of-the-world soybean market model 
We develop an aggregate structural econometric model of China and the rest-of-the-
world soybean market to quantify the relationships between the two markets and to 
examine the impacts of China’s soybean price support policies. With the assumption of 
nonlinear relationships and constant elasticities, we define the one-commodity, two-
region model as follows: 
 
𝑙𝑛𝑄𝑡
𝐷 = 𝐾1 + 𝜂1 ∙ 𝑙𝑛𝑃𝑡
𝑤 + 𝛾1 ∙ 𝑙𝑛𝑄𝑡−1
𝐷 + 𝑢1,         (1)   
ln𝑄𝑡
𝑆 = 𝐾2 + 𝜂2 ∙ 𝑙𝑛𝑃𝑡
𝑑 + 𝛾2 ∙ 𝐷𝑉𝑡 + 𝜃1 ∙ 𝑙𝑛𝑇 + 𝑢2,       (2) 
𝑙𝑛𝑋𝑡
𝐷 = 𝐾3 + 𝜂3 ∙ 𝑙𝑛𝑃𝑡
𝑑 + 𝛾3 ∙ 𝑙𝑛𝑃𝑡
𝑤 + 𝜃2 ∙ 𝑙𝑛𝑄𝑡−1
𝐷 + 𝑢3,      (3)  
𝑙𝑛𝑋𝑡
𝑆 = 𝐾4 + 𝜂4 ∙ 𝑙𝑛𝑃𝑡
𝑤 + 𝛾4 ∙ 𝑙𝑛𝑄𝑡−1
𝑅𝑊 + 𝑢4,         (4) 
𝑙𝑛𝑃𝑡
𝑑 = 𝐾5 + 𝜂5 ∙ 𝑙𝑛𝑃𝑡
𝑤 + 𝛾5 ∙ 𝑙𝑛𝑇𝑡 + 𝜃3 ∙ 𝐷𝑉𝑡 + 𝑢5,       (5) 
𝑙𝑛𝑋𝑡
𝐷 = 𝑙𝑛𝑋𝑡
𝑆,                (6) 
 
where 𝑄𝑡
𝐷  is China’s demand quantity; 𝑄𝑡
𝑆 is China’s supply quantity; 𝑋𝑡
𝐷 is China’s 
import demand quantity; 𝑋𝑡
𝑆 is the rest of the world’s aggregate export supply quantity; 
𝑃𝑡
𝑑 is China’s domestic soybean price; 𝑃𝑡
𝑤 is world soybean price; 𝑄𝑡−1
𝐷  is China’s 
demand quantity in the previous year; 𝑄𝑡−1
𝑅𝑊  is the rest of the world’s production in the 
previous year; 𝐷𝑉𝑡 is a dummy variable representing the implementation of China’s 
soybean price support policies; 𝑇 is a linear trend; the exponent parameters 𝜂, 𝛾, and 
𝜃  are constant elasticities representing the percentage response of the dependent 
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variable with regard to a 1% change of the corresponding explanatory variables; 𝐾𝑖 is 
a constant term; and, 𝑢𝑖  is the error term, which is independently and identically 
distributed with zero mean and constant variance 𝜎𝑖
2. 
Equations (1) to (6) capture China’s soybean price support policies in an aggregate 
form that can be examined within a structural model. The dummy variable (𝐷𝑉𝑡) is set 
to one after 2007 and to zero otherwise. 𝐷𝑉𝑡 is specified as a regressor in equation (2) 
since farmers are supposed to consider the policies while making acreage allocation 
decisions. Equation (3) embodies the hypothesis that when world prices rise relative to 
their domestic prices, imports become unprofitable and importers will import less.4 
Therefore, we expect 𝜂3  to be positive and 𝛾3  to be negative in the results. 
Considering the possibility of imperfection transmission of policy support prices, 𝐷𝑉𝑡 
is included in the price transmission equation (Colman, 1985). Coefficient 𝜃3 
represents the likely adjustments in domestic price resulting from the price support 






𝑆) and four 
predetermined variables (𝑄𝑡−1
𝐷 , 𝑄𝑡−1
𝑅𝑊 , 𝑇𝑡 and 𝐷𝑉𝑡) in the model and each equation is 
fully identified. Therefore, the three-stage least squares (3SLS) method is adopted to 
solve the endogenous problem. 
Although our aggregation model may confound the likely impacts of other important 
factors, including transportation costs and imperfect substitutability of different crops, 
it provides a more transparent framework and is easier to understand (Roberts and 
Schlenker, 2013). It should be noted that we have not specified China’s soybean tariff 
as an argument in the model since tariffs from 1985 to 2016 are fixed at the level of 3%. 
No attempt is made to model the China stockholding behavior since soybean stock 
                                                 
4 The original formulation of an aggregate import demand equation relates the import demand quantity to the ratio 
of import price to domestic price (Houthakker and Magee, 1969), which assumes a degree of substitutability between 
import and domestic commodities. Since China’s soybeans and imported soybeans are imperfect substitutes, we 
assume that the domestic and world price elasticities are different in equation (3). 
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volumes are resolved as a byproduct of the soybean price support policies, not as a 
result of an optimization procedure. However, China’s soybean supply volumes are 
adjusted for the stock changes in the model estimation. 







.    (7) 





(𝐾4 − 𝐾3 − 𝜂3 ∙ 𝑙𝑛𝑃𝑡
𝑑 − 𝜃2 ∙ 𝑙𝑛𝑄𝑡−1
𝐷 + 𝛾4 ∙ 𝑙𝑛𝑄𝑡−1
𝑅𝑊 + 𝑢4 − 𝑢3).     (8) 
Using the variances and covariances of the disturbance variables, variances can be 























.        (10) 
Expressions (9) and (10) show clearly and distinctly that the variance of their 
domestic and world soybean prices can be calculated utilizing model estimates, and that 
the dependence of variance on the price transmission elasticity, 𝜂5, is nonlinear. The 
policy instruments of intervention prices exert a downward pressure on the transmission 
of world price to domestic markets (Thompson et al., 2000), which means the price 
transmission elasticity, 𝜂5, would decrease if China’s soybean price support policies 
were implemented. Accordingly, if 𝜕𝜎
𝑙𝑛𝑃𝑡
𝑑
2 𝜕⁄ 𝜂5 > 0, then domestic price variability 
decreases after China’s soybean price support policies. If 𝜕𝜎
𝑙𝑛𝑃𝑡
𝑑
2 𝜕⁄ 𝜂5 < 0 , then 
domestic price variability increases after China’s soybean price support policies. If 
𝜕𝜎𝑙𝑛𝑃𝑡𝑤
2 𝜕⁄ 𝜂5 > 0, then the world price variability decreases after China’s soybean price 
support policies. If 𝜕𝜎𝑙𝑛𝑃𝑡𝑤
2 𝜕⁄ 𝜂5 < 0, then the world price variability increases after 
China’s soybean price support policies. 
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4.2. Economic welfare analysis 
From the above structural econometric model, we can calculate the distributional 
welfare changes in China and the rest of the world, including the changes in China’s 
producer surplus (∆𝑃𝑆), consumer surplus (∆𝐶𝑆), annual budgetary costs (𝐵𝐶) and 
exporter surplus in the rest of the world (∆𝑃𝑆). From (7) and (2), succeedingly and 







,      (11) 
𝑙𝑛𝑄𝑡
𝑆 = 𝐾2 + 𝛾2 ∙ 𝐷𝑉𝑡 + 𝜃1 ∙ 𝑙𝑛𝑇𝑡 + 𝑣2,𝑡 + 𝜂2 ∙ 𝑙𝑛𝑃𝑡
𝑑.        (12) 
Equations (11) and (12) are calculated for t=1, …, 33. We define 𝑚𝑡 = 𝐾2 + 𝛾2 ∙
𝐷𝑉𝑡 + 𝜃1 ∙ 𝑙𝑛𝑇𝑡 + 𝑣2,𝑡 . Normally distributed random numbers, 𝑉𝑖,𝑡 , with 
contemporaneous covariance matrix ∑  are generated.5 Solving equation (2) for 𝑃𝑡
𝑑, 
we get the annual domestic supply functions 
𝑃𝑡
𝑑 = 𝑒−𝑚𝑡/𝜂2 ∙ (𝑄𝑡
𝑆)1/𝜂2.              (13) 
Domestic prices are simulated under both the soybean price support policies, (𝑃𝑡
𝑑,1), 
and the free market, (𝑃𝑡
𝑑,0), using the dummy variable. For each t, the area above the 




) is the annual change of China’s producer surplus due 
to the price support policies, 













.  (14) 
Similarly, we compute the change in China’s consumer surplus. From equation (1), 
succeedingly and iteratively, we get 
𝑙𝑛𝑄𝑡
𝐷 = 𝐾1 + 𝛾1 ∙ 𝑙𝑛𝑄𝑡−1
𝐷 +𝑣1,𝑡 + 𝜂1 ∙ 𝑙𝑛𝑃𝑡
𝑤.          (15) 
                                                 
5 ∑  is obtained from the econometric model and is an estimate of the covariance matrix of the disturbance variables 
𝑢𝑖,𝑡, which are assumed to be constant over time. 
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We define 𝑛𝑡 = 𝐾1 + 𝛾1 ∙ 𝑙𝑛𝑄𝑡−1
𝐷 + 𝑣1,𝑡 . Solving equation (1) for 𝑃𝑡
𝑤 , we get the 
annual demand functions 
𝑃𝑡
𝑤 = 𝑒−𝑛𝑡/𝜂1 ∙ (𝑄𝑡
𝐷)1/𝜂1.               (16) 
World prices are simulated under both the soybean price support policies, (𝑃𝑡
𝑤,1), and 
the free market, (𝑃𝑡
𝑤,0), using the dummy variable. For each t, the area below the 




 is the annual change of China’s consumer surplus 
due to the price support policies, 













.   (17) 
We then calculate the exporters’ welfare change in the rest of the world. From 
equation (4), succeedingly and iteratively, we get 
𝑙𝑛𝑋𝑡
𝑆 = 𝐾4 + 𝛾4 ∙ 𝑙𝑛𝑄𝑡−1
𝑅𝑊 + 𝑣4,𝑡 + 𝜂4 ∙ 𝑙𝑛𝑃𝑡
𝑤.           (18) 
We define ℎ𝑡 = 𝐾4 + 𝛾4 ∙ 𝑙𝑛𝑄𝑡−1
𝑅𝑊 + 𝑣4,𝑡 . Solving equation (4) for 𝑃𝑡
𝑤 , we get the 
annual export supply functions 
𝑃𝑡
𝑤 = 𝑒−ℎ𝑡/𝜂4 ∙ (𝑋𝑡
𝑆)1/𝜂4.               (19) 




 is the exporters’ 
welfare change due to the price support policies, 













.  (20) 
Finally, China’s annual budgetary costs (𝐵𝐶𝑡) are calculated. Under the temporary 
procurement for reserve policy, the government procurement price is represented by 
𝑃𝑡
𝐺  and the procurement quantity is represented by 𝑄𝑡
𝐺 . Thus, we get 
𝐵𝐶𝑡 = 𝑃𝑡
𝐺 ∙ 𝑄𝑡
𝐺 .                 (21) 
The domestic net welfare change (∆𝐷𝑁𝑊𝑡) and world net welfare change (∆𝑊𝑁𝑊𝑡) 
are calculated as 
∆𝐷𝑁𝑊𝑡 = ∆𝑃𝑆𝑡 + ∆𝐶𝑆𝑡 + 𝐵𝐶𝑡,               (22) 
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∆𝑊𝑁𝑊𝑡 = ∆𝑃𝑆𝑡 + ∆𝐶𝑆𝑡 + 𝐵𝐶𝑡 + ∆𝑅𝑊𝑡.                (23) 
 
4.3. Data  
To estimate the econometric model and generate the welfare results, we compile a 
dataset with both Chinese and international sources from 1985 to 2016. The quantity 
demanded and supplied in China are sourced from the China Rural Statistical Yearbook 
(NSBC, 1986–2017). The quantity demanded in China is defined as the sum of 
domestic consumption and exports, and the quantity supplied is defined as the sum of 
domestic production and changes in stocks. China’s import demand data are obtained 
from the General Administration of Customs, P.R. China. The production quantity data 
of the world are obtained from the Economic Research Service by the United States 
Department of Agriculture (USDA-ERS). China’s domestic prices are obtained from 
the National Cost-Benefit Compilation of Agricultural Product (NSBC, 1986–2017). 
World soybean prices, CIF Rotterdam($US), are also collected from the USDA-ERS. 
Government procurement prices and quantities are sourced from the National Food & 
Strategic Reserves Administration, P.R. China. To ensure the consistency and 
comparability of the nominal variables, currency exchange rates collected from the 
International Monetary Fund are used to convert China’s domestic prices in U.S. dollars. 
To remove the general inflationary trend, both nominal prices are converted to real 
prices using 2010 as the base year. We use the logarithm form to eliminate the trend 
effects and to alleviate the problems of heteroscedasticity, which satisfies the 
hypotheses of nonlinear relationships and constant elasticities. 
Table 2 shows the descriptive statistics of main variables. The nonstationary of the 
levels and the first differences for each variable are tested through the augmented 
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Dickey-Fuller (ADF) test and the results are presented in the Appendix Table A1. All 
the variables are integrated of order one, thus enabling the following empirical analysis. 
 
[Table 2 about here] 
 
5. Model estimation 
In this section, we first estimate the structural econometric model defined in the 
previous section and analyze the impacts of China’s price support policies on soybean 
price variability. We then calculate the distributional and aggregate welfare changes in 
both China and the rest of the world using the estimated model. Lastly, we perform 
three robustness tests by (a) employing the Generalized Autoregressive Conditional 
Heteroscedasticity (GARCH) model; (b) using data from different source; (c) using 
data of different time period. 
 
5.1. Impacts of China’s soybean price support policies on price variability 
For our structural econometric model, ordinary least squares (OLS) estimates are 
inconsistent and inefficient since the correlations among equations are neglected. The 
two stage least squares (2SLS) method does account for the endogenous variables, but 
ignores the possible correlations among the disturbances. The seemingly unrelated 
regression (SUR) method does account for the covariance structure of the residuals, but 
not the endogenous variables, which could lead to simultaneity bias. Therefore, with 
the right-hand side endogenous variables and contemporaneous correlation among the 
disturbances in our model, we adopt the 3SLS method to derive the estimates. The 3SLS 
could be considered a combination of 2SLS and SUR. Table 3 reports the parameter 
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estimates. We also tabulate the OLS, SUR, and 2SLS parameter estimates to illustrate 
the likely endogeneity bias in comparison to the 3SLS estimates. 
 
[Table 3 about here] 
 
Compared with the results from the 2SLS method, estimates based on the 3SLS 
method are more statistically significant; while some variable estimates show variations. 
The OLS, SUR, and 2SLS regressions give relatively inelastic estimates of domestic 






  are at least two 
times the 3SLS estimates, which indicates that the predicted price increase would be 
much larger if we ignore the endogeneity problem and the cross-correlation in error 
terms. The ADF test on all residual series of five equations in 3SLS regression rejects 
the null hypothesis that series is non-stationary, which eliminates the possibility of 
spurious regression. All F-statistics for first-stage instruments in 3SLS regression are 
greater than ten, which indicates that the null hypothesis of weak instruments can be 
rejected. 
The estimates of elasticity coefficients are reasonable. Domestic demand elasticity is 
-0.121, domestic supply elasticity is 0.549, domestic price elasticity of import demand 
is 0.934, world price elasticity of import demand is -1.081, export supply elasticity is 
0.516 and price transmission elasticity is 0.412. The domestic demand is extremely 
inelastic to world price, which is consistent with the conclusion from Tan and Wu 
(2009). The price elasticity of China’s soybean supply is close to the 0.64 estimate 
obtained by Liu and Guo (2017). Equations (3) and (4) imply a relatively large response 
of soybean imports to the world price and a relatively small response of soybean exports 
in the rest of the world to world price, which is consistent with the findings derived by 
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Zhao and Zheng (2015). The price transmission elasticity compares to the 0.36 estimate 
of Wang and Xie (2012). The sign and significance of the dummy variable parameter 
in equation (5) indicate an ascending trend in domestic price since China’s soybean 
price support policies.6 According to Xu et al. (2016), China’s soybean price support 
policies decrease the price transmission effects from the world soybean market to their 
domestic soybean market. 
Figure 5 plots the dependency of price variances on price transmission elasticity from 
equations (9) and (10). It is appreciable that as the price transmission elasticity 
decreases, both domestic and world price variabilities decrease and the predicted 
variability drop of domestic price is larger than that of world price. According to the 
above theoretical analysis, we can get the following inequalities: 𝜕𝜎
𝑙𝑛𝑃𝑡
𝑑
2 𝜕⁄ 𝜂5 > 0, 
𝜕𝜎𝑙𝑛𝑃𝑡𝑤
2 𝜕⁄ 𝜂5 > 0  and 𝜕𝜎𝑙𝑛𝑃𝑡𝑑
2 𝜕⁄ 𝜂5 > 𝜕𝜎𝑙𝑛𝑃𝑡𝑤
2 𝜕⁄ 𝜂5 . On the one hand, China’s 
soybean price support policies play an effective role in stabilizing domestic price; and, 
on the other hand, China’s soybean import increase that resulted from the price support 
policies balance the surplus of world soybean production, and thus reduce the world 
price variability. In other words, the disruption in world market production is partly 
accommodated for by the adjustments in China’s soybean market caused by price 
support policies. 
 
[Figure 5 about here] 
 
The effects of such domestic policies can best be visualized through a hypothetical 
example. Assume that China accounts for one-third of the world’s soybean 
                                                 
6 A Chow-test (Chow, 1960) for structural change is performed based on two regressions of 𝑃𝑑 on 𝑝𝑤  and 𝑇. 
The first regression is for t=1 (1985), …, 23 (2007) and the second one is for t=24 (2008), …, 32 (2016). The null 
hypothesis of no structural change is rejected as p-value is less than 0.0001.  
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consumption and that they intervene in domestic prices through price support policies;7 
and assume there is an exogenous shock that increases the world’s output of soybeans 
by 5%. 8  Assume further that the world’s short-run price elasticity of demand for 
soybeans is -0.1 and China’s policies increase its soybean imports by 10%.9 The effects 
of China’s policies are to require the rest of the world that normally consumes two-
thirds of the world’s soybeans to increase their use by 2.5%. If the price elasticity of 
demand were -0.1 in the rest of the world, the decrease in price from a world production 
surplus of 5%, assuming stable demand, would be 25%. If there were no price support 
policies in China, the decline in price for the world would be approximately 50%. Thus, 
one-third of the world following such policies decreases the price swings for the rest of 
the world unless there are stocks to absorb the production surplus. 
 
5.2. Impacts of China’s soybean price support policies on economic welfare 
The Monte Carlo method is adopted to evaluate uncertainty in welfare computations 
that is difficult to predict due to the interference of random variables. Using the model 
estimates, we perform a Monte Carlo simulation with 10,000 replications. Table 4 
provides the numerical results from 2008 to 2016. The welfare estimates are mean 
values and the uncertainty measures are standard deviations from all 10,000 simulated 
series. The estimated welfare impacts of China’s soybean price support policies include: 
change in China’s producer surplus (∆𝑃𝑆𝑡), consumer surplus (∆𝐶𝑆𝑡), annual budgetary 
costs (𝐵𝐶𝑡), China’s net welfare change (∆𝐷𝑁𝑊𝑡), exporters’ welfare change in the rest 
of the world (∆𝑅𝑊𝑡) and world net welfare change (∆𝑊𝑁𝑊𝑡). 
                                                 
7 The level of one-third is not chosen arbitrarily—approximately one-third of world soybean use in recent years has 
occurred in China (Authors’ calculation from the USDA data). 
8 The level of 5% is not chosen arbitrarily. The soybean production in the world grew at an annual rate of around 5% 
from 2008 to 2016 (Authors’ calculation from the USDA data). 
9 The level of 10% is not chosen arbitrarily. China’s soybean imports have shown an average annual growth of about 
10% from 2008 to 2016 (Authors’ calculation from the USDA data). 
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[Table 4 about here] 
 
China’s soybean price support policies benefit domestic producers; however, 
domestic consumers suffer because they pay a higher price for soybeans. China’s net 
welfare change resulting from price support policies is negative. Since the world 
soybean price is higher under China’s soybean price support policies as compared to 
free trade, exporters in the rest of the world benefit a lot and their welfare increase is, 
to a large extent, an income transfer from China. Overall, the world net welfare change 
attributed to China’s soybean price support policies is positive and continues to increase 
from $520.3 million in 2008 to $2.1 billion in 2016. Standard errors of welfare 
estimates show a high level of confidence in the results. 
There are two interesting things to be noted about 2016. First, the budgetary costs 
and social welfare loss in 2016 are far less than those during the temporary procurement 
for reserve policy (2008–2013), while the changes in producer surplus basically remain 
at the same level—above $2.7 billion—which indicates that the target price policy 
could improve farm income at the same level as the temporary procurement for reserve 
policy, but with relatively less budgetary costs. Second, the domestic social welfare 
loss in 2016 remains high—above $10 billion. Although the target price policy 
significantly reduces government expenditure, it is still economically inefficient due to 
the huge loss of consumer welfare. 
These findings corroborate the ex-ante findings by Yu and Jensen (2010) that China’s 
agricultural support policy would significantly increase domestic farm income. 
Compared to coupled policy, decoupled policy instruments are more economically 
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efficient.10 Our results are also in favor of the ex-ante arguments obtained by Huang et 
al. (2010) that China’s agricultural policies would benefit the rest of world. They use 
the Global Trade Analysis Project model and emphasize that, since it is to China’s 
comparative advantage to import land-intensive products (such as oilseeds), China's 
increasing imports of oilseeds and oilseed products could help countries with a 
comparative advantage in these products expand their production and benefit from the 
trade surplus. 
 
5.3. Further robustness checks  
To verify the validity of the effects of China’s soybean price support policies on price 
volatility, we perform a robustness test using daily data through the GARCH model.11 
We extend the traditional GARCH model to derive the possible adjustments in price 
volatility associated with China’s soybean price support policies. An AR(k)-GARCH(p, 
q) model with a dummy variable is specified in the following: 
 
𝑅𝑡 = 𝜇 + ∑ 𝛿𝑠𝑅𝑡−𝑠
𝑠=𝑘
𝑠=1 + 𝑡,              (24)  
𝑡|Ω𝑡 ∼ 𝑡(0, 𝜎𝑡
2, 𝑣),                (25) 
𝜎𝑡
2 = 𝜔 + ∑ 𝛼𝑖 𝑡−𝑖
2𝑝
𝑖 + ∑ 𝛽𝑗𝜎𝑡−𝑗
2𝑞
𝑗 + 𝑑𝐷𝑉𝑡,          (26) 
 
where 𝑅𝑡 represents the price return; 𝑡(0, 𝜎𝑡
2, 𝑣) is the student’s t density with mean 
zero, variance 𝜎𝑡
2, and degree of freedom 𝑣; 𝑘, 𝑝, and 𝑞 are lag lengths; 𝐷𝑉𝑡 is a 
                                                 
10 Yu and Jensen (2010) use the CGE model and maintain that if China uses all the support permitted under WTO 
de minimis limits, their farm income would increase by 12%. However, if decoupled instruments, for instance the 
producer subsidy policy, are adopted to raise China’s agricultural support to the same level, their farm income would 
increase by nearly 15%. 
11 In the GARCH model, price volatility is generally analyzed as the conditional variance, as pioneered by Engle 
(1982) and generalized by Bollerslev (1986). 
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vector of China’s soybean price support policies dummies; 𝜇, 𝛿𝑠, 𝜔, 𝛼𝑖, 𝛽𝑗 , and 𝑑 
are the parameters to be estimated. Price volatility is considered by the conditional 
variance 𝜎𝑡
2 in equation (26), which is specified as a linear function of squared errors 
𝑡−𝑖
2 , conditional variance 𝜎𝑡−𝑗
2 , and dummy variable 𝐷𝑉𝑡. The positive (negative) sign 
of the coefficient 𝑑 implies the upward (downward) trend in the price volatility. 
We utilize the daily data on China’s soybean futures prices and Chicago Board of 
Trade (CBOT) soybean futures prices from January 3, 2000 to December 30, 2016. 
Data are obtained from Dalian Commodity Exchange (DCE) and Chicago Board of 
Trade, respectively.12 The price returns are calculated based on the first difference of 
logarithm of prices. Appendix Table A2 reports the descriptive analysis and ADF test 
results of both China’s and CBOT soybean futures price returns. The results indicate 
that both prices data are stationary and significantly different from normal distribution. 
The robustness test is conducted in GARCH (1,1).13 Table 5 presents the results. 
The coefficients of GARCH effects (𝛼 and 𝛽) are significant in both cases, which 
confirms the time-varying pattern of price variabilities. The coefficient 𝑑 is negative 
and significant at the 1% level for China’s soybean price return and at the 10% level 
for the CBOT soybean price return, implying a decrease in price volatilities of both 
China’s soybean price and CBOT soybean price after China’s price support policies. 
Moreover, the downward pressure on China’s price volatility is greater than that on the 
CBOT price volatility, which is consistent with previous results from the structural 
econometric model. 
 
                                                 
12 The DCE is the largest soybean trading exchange in China. The specified futures contracts are the No. 1 soybean 
futures in DCE (http://www.dce.com.cn/DCE/) and soybean futures in CBOT (https://www.cmegroup.com/ 
company/cbot.html). 
13 According to the parsimony criteria, GARCH models are considered a special case of an AMAR process (Tsay, 
1987). Through a Box-Jenkins methodological procedure, a GARCH (1,1) model presents the best fit. Higher-order 
GARCH formulations add no significant improvements in goodness-of-fit. 
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[Table 5 about here] 
 
To prove that our estimates are invariant and reliable, we perform two additional 
robustness checks and report the results in Appendix Table A3. First, we use quantity 
data from the Foreign Agricultural Service by the United States Department of 
Agriculture (USDA-FAS) to re-estimate the model. 14  Second, we re-estimate our 
model using data prior to the introduction of the target price policy (1985–2013). The 
target price policy, introduced in 2014, may intervene in the domestic soybean price 
differently than the temporary procurement for reserve policy and change the domestic 
supply differently. If the change in domestic supply and corresponding import demand 
were large enough, it would confound our results. In Appendix Table A4, we can see 
that the results remain generally robust, as the price multipliers of domestic demand 
shift in both cases are around 1.4 and the price multiplier of import demand shift in the 
first case is 0.535, which are close to our estimated results from the structural model. 
The multiplier of import demand shift in the second case is smaller and a possible 
reason is the data loss. 
 
6. Conclusions and implications 
Over the last two decades, a series of fundamental changes took effect in China’s 
soybean markets and drastically changed the dynamics of the world soybean market. 
The impacts of agricultural subsidy and trade policies have been thoroughly analyzed 
in the literature. However, ex-post empirical analyses on the impacts of China’s 
soybean price support policies have not been conducted, a momentous analytical gap 
that deserves more attention. This article contributes to the literature by evaluating, 
                                                 
14 The quantity data refer to the quantity demanded, quantity supplied, and import quantity. 
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theoretically and empirically, the ex-post worldwide impacts of China’s soybean price 
support policies on price variability and economic welfare.  
We present, for the first time, an integrated picture of the worldwide impacts of 
China’s soybean price support policies through a structural econometric model of the 
China/rest-of-the-world soybean market. Although our model is simple, it gains 
transparency. The estimates can be taken as a supplement to the more sophisticated 
computational models, wherein other important factors (including the transportation 
costs, imperfect substitutability of different crops, and so forth) are considered, and 
different regions are estimated individually. Our model estimates provide an effective 
check for whether negligible changes add up to big results that can be observed in the 
aggregate data.  
We first explore the price variability effects of China’s soybean price support policies 
by estimating the model using 3SLS method. We derive the dependency of domestic 
and world price volatility on price transmission elasticity based on the model estimates. 
On the one hand, China’s soybean price support policies stabilize domestic prices. On 
the other hand, China’s policies reduce the world price swings. The disruption in the 
world market production is partly accommodated for by the increasing soybean imports 
driven by China’s soybean price support policies. We then use our model estimates to 
explore the distributional and aggregate welfare impacts of China’s soybean price 
support policies in both China and the rest of the world. The results indicate that China’s 
producer welfare gain at the expense of consumer and budgetary costs. The net welfare 
change in their domestic market is negative. Compared to the temporary procurement 
for reserve policy, the target price policy could improve farm income with relatively 
less government expenditures. Meanwhile, China’s soybean price support policies 
result in a welfare gain for exporters in the rest of the world. Overall, the world net 
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welfare change is positive and continues to increase from 2008 to 2016. These results 
are proven to be generally robust through a GARCH model and two sensitivity tests. 
What is the practical importance of this study? First, the price effects of China’s 
soybean price support policies challenge the conventional wisdom that the realization 
of price stabilization in one country or region would cause price instability elsewhere 
(e.g., Zwart and Meilke, 1979; Sarris and Freebairn, 1983). Different types of 
agricultural support policies could have remarkably different impacts on world price 
variability. In the case of China’s soybean market, the price support policies increase 
the domestic prices and lead to increasing imports, which, to some extent, is similar to 
the trade liberalization policies. Thus, both the amount and the type of agricultural 
support policies should be accounted for if the trade negotiations under the WTO 
agreements are to address the issue of price variability. Second, this study informs the 
debate about the functioning of the price support policies and provides some insights 
for future policy reform. The dilemma in China’s soybean market is that the costs of 
support policies are high while the benefits are low. This problem also emerged in other 
Asian and Latin American countries, where producers relied on a variety of agricultural 
support policies to stimulate grain production and farm income. Throughout history, 
many agricultural support policies suffered from excessive costs, especially when the 
world price fell below the domestic support price. The excessive costs typically led to 
new reforms, which happened in 1990s both in the United States (Gardner, 2006) and 
the European Union (Grant, 1997). Looking forward, China and other developing 
countries in Asia and Latin America should gradually withdraw the high-cost price 
support policies and find more efficient policy instruments to increase grain production 
capacity and improve farm income. Third, with increasing soybean imports driven by 
China’s soybean price support policies, the price risk in the world market reduces and 
 25 
the soybean exporting countries experience considerable welfare gains. However, 
while pursuing food security, the Chinese government initiated the producer subsidy 
policy for soybeans in 2017 with the aim to separate direct subsidy from price support. 
It is well known that China’s soybean imports fell from 95 million tons in 2017 to 88 
million tons in 2018. Furthermore, under escalating tensions regarding U.S.-China 
agricultural trade, a significant uncertainty exists in the world soybean trade pattern. If 
China’s soybean imports continued to decrease, it might have the opposite impacts on 
the world market, which should be re-examined in future research. 
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Table 1. China’s soybean support policies, 2008–2017 
Year 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 
Support price (Yuan/t) 3700 3740 3800 4000 4600 4600 4800 4800 4800 -- 
Procurement volume 
(1000t) 
3134 6530 6488 4657 5639 3080 3172 1401 660 -- 
Grain and oil reserve 
expenditure (Billion 
yuan) 
148.1 110.6 117.2 127.0 137.6 164.9 193.9 261.3 219.0 225.1 
Sources: Support prices: National Development and Reform Commission, P.R. China; procurement 
volume: National Grain & Oil Information Center, P.R. China; Grain and oil reserve expenditure: 



















Table 2. Descriptive statistics of main variables, 1985–2016 
Variable Obs. Mean SD Minimum Maximum 
Quantity demanded of China (1000 tons)  32 10.21 0.85 9.08   11.52 
Quantity supplied of China (1000 tons) 32 9.51 0.16 9.18    9.76 
Import quantity (1000 tons) 32 9.31 1.43 7.31     11.37 
Domestic price (U.S. dollar/ton) 32 5.81 0.40 5.34     6.56 
World price (U.S. dollar/ton) 32 5.71 0.33 5.28    6.39 
























Table 3. Model parameter estimates, 1985–2016 
 
OLS SUR 2SLS 3SLS 
Equation (1) 
𝑙𝑛𝑃𝑤 -0.102 -0.121* -0.091 -0.121* 
 
(0.084) (0.077) (0.113) (0.105) 
𝑙𝑛𝑄𝑡−1
𝐷  1.041*** 1.048*** 1.037*** 1.051*** 
 
(0.035) (0.032) (0.042) (0.039) 
𝑙𝑛𝐾1 0.242 0.275 0.215 0.252 
 
(0.315) (0.298) (0.369) (0.348) 
Equation (2) 
𝑙𝑛𝑃𝑑 0.242* 0.128 0.245 0.549** 
 
(0.128) (0.104) (0.542) (0.353) 
𝐷𝑉 -0.017 -0.113 -0.332 -0.520** 
 
(0.099) (0.079) (0.358) (0.242) 
𝑙𝑛𝑇𝑡 0.195*** 0.187*** 0.141* 0.101** 
 (0.041) (0.035) (0.077) (0.053) 
𝑙𝑛𝐾2 10.418*** 9.803*** 7.812*** 6.202*** 
 
(0.692) (0.558) (2.897) (1.903) 
Equation (3) 
𝑙𝑛𝑃𝑑 -0.015 -0.007 0.474 0.934* 
 
(0.413) (0.267) (1.238) (0.847) 
𝑙𝑛𝑃𝑤 -0.195 -0.118 -0.538 -1.081* 
 
(0.421) (0.301) (1.146) (0.810) 
𝑙𝑛𝑄𝑡−1
𝐷  1.793*** 1.744*** 1.766*** 1.678*** 
 (0.088) (0.074) (0.176) (0.129) 
𝑙𝑛𝐾3 -7.661*** -7.642*** -7.126*** -6.948*** 
 (0.722) (0.652) (1.080) (0.909) 
Equation (4) 
𝑙𝑛𝑃𝑤 0.297* 0.358** 0.437** 0.576** 
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(0.201) (0.186) (0.262) (0.242) 
𝑙𝑛𝑄𝑡−1
𝑅𝑊  3.175*** 3.092*** 3.041*** 3.001*** 
 (0.163) (0.149) (0.191) (0.175) 
𝑙𝑛𝐾4 -30.272*** -29.621*** -30.019*** -29.781*** 
 
(1.409) (1.312) (1.453) (1.360) 
Equation (5) 
𝑙𝑛𝑃𝑤 0.902*** 0.891*** 0.478 0.412* 
 
(0.127) (0.118) (0.491) (0.375) 
𝑙𝑛𝑇𝑡 0.060* 0.060* 0.084* 0.095** 
 
(0.035) (0.033) (0.049) (0.042) 
𝐷𝑉 0.121 0.132* 0.368* 0.399** 
 
(0.092) (0.085) (0.293) (0.227) 
𝑙𝑛𝐾5 0.472 0.0.530 2.761 3.104* 
 
(0.694) (0.641) (2.657) (2.028) 




 2.906 4.021 2.973 1.493 




 2.030 2.100 1.030 0.604 
Obs. 31 31 31 31 
Notes: The four columns present results for OLS regressions, Seemingly Unrelated Regressions (SUR), 
Two-stage Least Squares (2SLS) and Three-stage Least Squares (3SLS), respectively. Two multipliers 
translate percentage changes in demand into percentage changes in equilibrium price in China’s soybean 
market and the world market, respectively. 
*, **, and *** denote statistical significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. Standard errors 






Table 4. Welfare estimates in China and the rest of the world (Million U.S. Dollars) 
Year 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 
∆𝑃𝑆𝑡 2620.6 2940.9 2408.5 2599.3 3283.3 2884.2 2803.3 2496.3 2796.9 
 (55.7) (62.5) (51.1) (55.2) (69.7) (61.2) (59.5) (53.0) (59.4) 
∆𝐶𝑆𝑡 -6312.1 -7723. 6 -6522.8 -8087.7 -10600.0 -10800.0 -10800.0 -9693.0 -12500.0 
 (489.2) (598.5) (505.5) (626.8) (977.9) (836.2) (838.1) (751.2) (970.3) 
𝐵𝐶𝑡 -1669.6 -3575.2 -3642.0 -2751.8 -4109.2 -2287.7 -- -- -904.9 
∆𝐷𝑁𝑊𝑡 -5361.1 -8358.2 -7756.3 -8240.2 -11425.9 -10203.5 -- -- -10608.0 
∆𝑅𝑊𝑡 5881.4 8680.6 8519.9 9341.3 12500.0 11600.0 12500.0 12300.0 12700.0 
 (260.4) (295.3) (332.7) (412.9) (551.7) (556.6) (598.1) (632.8) (780.8) 
∆𝑊𝑁𝑊𝑡 520.3 322.4 763.6 1101.1 1074.1 1396.5 -- -- 2092.0 
Sources: Authors’ computation. 
Notes: China’s soybean procurement prices and quantities data (2008–2013) are collected from the 
National Food & Strategic Reserves Administration, P.R. China (http://www.lswz.gov.cn/). The 2016 
budgetary cost is obtained from the Ministry of Finance of the People’s Republic of China 














Table 5. Results of GARCH (1,1), 2000–2016 





















𝛼 + 𝛽 0.865 0.986 
Notes: *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. Z statistics 



















Fig. 1. China’s soybean production, imports, stocks, and China’s prices and world prices. 
Sources: China’s production and soybean prices: China Grain Yearbook (2002–2018); stocks: BRIC 
Agricultural Database; imports: General Administration of Customs, P.R. China; world soybean prices: 
Food and Agricultural Organization (FAO). 
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Fig. 4. World soybean production, world soybean exports and China’s soybean imports. 
 






































World production World exports China's imports Linear trend of world production
 39 
Fig. 5. Variances of domestic and world soybean prices and the price transmission elasticity. 
 



















Table A1. Results of ADF test, 1985–2016 
Values 𝑙𝑛𝑄𝐷 𝑙𝑛𝑄𝑆 𝑙𝑛𝑋 𝑙𝑛𝑃𝑑 𝑙𝑛𝑃𝑤 𝑙𝑛𝑄𝑅𝑊 
Levels 0.393 -2.420 -0.258 -1.164 -1.288 -0.020 
First Differences -4.652 -5.610 -6.073 -4.822 -4.560 -8.774 























Table A2. Data description and ADF test results of China’s and world soybean futures price (U.S. 
dollar per metric ton), 2000–2016 
Values China’s soybean futures price CBOT soybean futures price 
Data description   
Mean 0.000 0.000 
St. deviation 0.013 0.015 
Skewness -1.425 -0.208 
Kurtosis 31.013 5.247 
Observations 4280 4280 
ADF test results   
Levels -70.622 -66.570 



















Table A3. Results of two additional robustness checks 
 
USDA-FAS data (1985–2016) Original data (1985–2013) 
Equation (1) 
𝑙𝑛𝑃𝑤 -0.084 -0.076 
 (0.114) (0.111) 
𝑙𝑛𝑄𝑡−1
𝐷  1.041*** 1.038*** 
 (0.045) (0.045) 
𝑙𝑛𝐾1 0.140 0.123 
 (0.362) (0.377) 
Equation (2) 
𝑙𝑛𝑃𝑑 0.749*** 0.620* 
 (0.698) (0.457) 
𝐷𝑉 -0.531*** -0.500* 
 (0.471) (0.308) 
𝑙𝑛𝑇𝑡 0.090 0.084* 
 (0.106) (0.063) 
𝑙𝑛𝐾2 4.666* 5.847** 
 (3.649) (2.462) 
Equation (3) 
𝑙𝑛𝑃𝑑 0.842 4.670** 
 (1.113) (2.088) 
𝑙𝑛𝑃𝑤 -1.055* -4.419** 
 (1.077) (1.821) 
𝑙𝑛𝑄𝑡−1
𝐷  1.848*** 1.424*** 
 (0.791) (0.248) 
𝑙𝑛𝐾3 -8.237** -6.926*** 
 (2.284) (1.065) 
Equation (4) 
𝑙𝑛𝑃𝑤 0.814 0.606** 
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 (0.338) (0.247) 
𝑙𝑛𝑄𝑡−1
𝑅𝑊  3.262*** 3.076*** 
 (0.204) (0.194) 
𝑙𝑛𝐾4 -36.245*** -30.829*** 
 (1.802) (1.603) 
Equation (5) 
𝑙𝑛𝑃𝑤 0.327 0.378 
 (0.288) (0.349) 
𝑙𝑛𝑇𝑡 0.084* 0.099*** 
 (0.042) (0.031) 
𝐷𝑉 0.626*** 0.393* 
 (0.201) (0.233) 
𝑙𝑛𝐾5 5.015*** 3.279* 








 0.535 0.199 
Obs. 31 28 
Notes: The first column shows regression results utilizing quantity data from the USDA-FAS. The 
second shows the results utilizing the 1985–2013 data. 
*, **, and *** denote statistical significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. Standard errors 
are in parentheses. 
